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REMEDIES MATTER:  
EVALUATING THE EFFICACY OF REMEDIES IN PUBLIC 
LAW LITIGATION FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION 
Joanne Cave* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the concept of meaningful remedies for individual 
and classes of litigants in lawsuits against the Crown. Using two case 
studies, this paper discusses how litigants can ensure that remedies 
obtained against the Crown promote accountability and enforceability, 
behaviour change and systemic change. These case studies 
include Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), which 
considered the scope of humanitarian & compassionate considerations 
for children seeking refugee protection in Canada, and First Nations 
Child and Family Caring Society v Canada (Attorney General), which 
addressed the implementation of Jordan’s Principle for First Nations 
children. The author uses these case studies to analyze the challenges 
of implementing meaningful remedies in practice and concludes with 
three key observations of how Crown executive actors tend to 
respond to remedies ordered by courts and administrative tribunals: 
(1) they are largely distrusting of remedies ordered by administrative 
tribunals; (2) they are largely motivated by political opportunism; and 
(3) they often opt to introduce systemic changes through soft law 
rather than legally binding measures.  
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“Justice includes meaningful remedies.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 2018 decision First Nations Child and Family Caring Society v Canada 
(Attorney General), the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (CHRT) used the above 
statement to reinforce the importance of the Government of Canada complying 
with the short- and long-term human rights remedies awarded to First Nations 
children for the wilful underfunding of on-reserve child welfare services.2 The 
Tribunal ordered numerous policy changes to address systemic discrimination 
and $40,000 in compensation (the Tribunal maximum) for each of the estimated 
54,000 First Nations children and parents impacted by the proceeding—totaling 
two billion dollars.3 While the Government of Canada has introduced a First 
Nations Child and Family Services Compensation Process, there have been 
significant barriers to the implementation and enforcement of this compensation 
scheme to date.4 The Latin legal maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium provides that there is 
no right without a remedy in law.5 However, the maxim provides no guarantee 
that a remedy will be meaningful, effective, or enforceable. Cases such as First 
Nations Child and Family Caring Society illustrate that while remedies may be 
available in public law litigation, it is their implementation and enforcement that 
can prove to be exceptionally challenging for courts, tribunals, and litigants. 
 
1 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 CHRT 4 at 
para 387 [2018 FNCFCS Decision]. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Mia Rabson, “First Nations given max compensation for Ottawa’s child-welfare 
discrimination” The National Post (6 September 2019), online: 
<nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/first-nations-given-maximum-
compensation-for-ottawas-child-welfare-discrimination>.  
4 For recent examples of these challenges, see First Nations Child and Family Caring Society 
v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 CHRT 39 [2019 FNCFCS Decision] and First Nations 
Child and Family Caring Society v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 CHRT 7 [2020 FNCFCS 
Decision]. See also Government of Canada, “First Nations Child Services 
Compensation Process”, online: <www.fnchildcompensation.ca>.  
5 Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at para 25 [Doucet-
Boudreau]. 
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Meaningful remedies in public law litigation look very different when 
compared to disputes between private parties. Public law issues often affect the 
interests of many people— who may constitute a class—with the judge’s 
“continuing involvement in [the] administration and implementation” of 
complex remedies that often intersect with the government’s policy-making 
function.6 One of the most important distinguishing features of public law 
litigation is the potential for remedies to modify future behaviour rather than 
provide redress for previous wrongs.7 These future-oriented remedies can be 
individual or systemic in nature, and often function as a tool “to bring about the 
reversal of entrenched patterns of discrimination and inequality that are the 
product of institutional, societal and governmental structures and inertia.”8  
Evaluating whether these types of remedies are meaningful rests on an 
important philosophical distinction: whether our conception of law is 
instrumentalist (intended to influence human behaviour or improve societal 
conditions) or non-instrumentalist (intended to realize principles and values of 
justice).9 In this paper I focus on instrumentalism, recognizing that creating 
lasting change at both an individual and systemic level is one of the more practical 
functions of our justice system, rather than merely providing corrective justice or 
compensatory relief to parties that have been wronged.10 
I consider the role of remedies in public law litigation that focuses on 
executive action, drawing on jurisprudence and secondary sources in law, 
sociolegal studies, political science, and public administration. Meaningful 
remedies in the Crown’s exercise of legislative power have been discussed in 
 
6 Abram Chayes, “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89:7 Harv L 
Rev 1281 at 1281, 1284. 
7 Ibid at 1298.  
8 Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day & Frances Kelly, “The Authority of Human Rights 
Tribunals to Grant Systemic Remedies” (2017) 6:1 Can J Hum Rts 3 at 4.  
9 Peter Cane, “Understanding Judicial Review and Its Impact” in Marc Hertogh and 
Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 15 at 16.  
10 Stephen M Johnson, "From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: 
Common Law Remedies for Public Law Failures" (2011) 27:3 Ga St U L Rev 565 at 
572. 
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detail, particularly in the context of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.11  However, 
few Canadian legal scholars have focused on how courts provide remedies in the 
Crown’s exercise of executive power, and it remains a widely misunderstood area 
in Canadian public and administrative law. I use case studies as a methodology to 
explore this issue further, appreciating that a meaningful discussion about 
remedies requires depth and context. In this paper, I discuss executive action in 
both its political and administrative context, referring to public officials and 
institutions (e.g., the Prime Minister of Canada, members of Cabinet and their 
senior ministerial staff, administrative tribunals appointed by Cabinet) that 
oversee the implementation and enforcement of laws.12 In some circumstances, 
such as the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society case study, courts are asked 
to oversee how administrative tribunals, exercising an executive function, succeed 
or fail in holding other executive actors accountable. Depending on the nature of 
the legal claim, a variety of remedies can be available, including monetary 
damages, injunctive relief, or prerogative writ remedies upon judicial review.  
In this paper, I make three key observations about how executive actors 
responded to tribunal or court-ordered remedies in two case studies: (1) they are 
largely distrusting of remedies ordered by administrative tribunals; (2) they are 
often motivated by political opportunism; and (3) they often opt to introduce 
systemic changes through soft law rather than legally binding measures. After 
exploring the importance of remedies for executive action in Part II, I develop 
an analytical framework to consider whether a remedy is meaningful in the 
context of executive action in Part III. This analytical framework draws on law 
professors Peter Cane and Maurice Sunkin’s research to articulate three key 
indicia: accountability and enforceability, behaviour change (both individual and 
institutional), and systemic change. In Part IV, I apply this analytical framework 
to discuss two case studies of litigation against the federal Crown for executive 
action: the 2015 Supreme Court of Canada decision Kanthasamy v Canada 
(Citizenship & Immigration)13 and the series of Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 
 
11 See Kent Roach, Constitutional remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Thomson Reuters 
Canada, 2019) (loose-leaf edition updated 2019, release 34). 
12 Craig Forcese et al, eds, Public Law: Cases, Commentary and Analysis (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 2015) at 297. 
13 2015 SCC 61 [Kanthasamy]. 
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decisions from 2011–2021 in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society v Canada 
(Attorney General).14 I use these case studies to illustrate how executive actors can 
respond differently to tribunal or court-ordered remedies to address a similar 
issue (the welfare of marginalized or disadvantaged children).  
II. WHY DO MEANINGFUL REMEDIES FOR EXECUTIVE 
ACTION MATTER? 
Meaningful judicial remedies for executive action are critical to maintain the 
integrity of the rule of law. In Canada, political executive actors (e.g., the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet) can have “significant control over the legislative agenda”15 
when they exercise their statutory or prerogative powers to implement or enforce 
laws. When administrative executive actors such as public officials or 
administrative decision-making bodies perform governmental functions, they 
often exercise significant discretion when interpreting and applying legislative or 
judicial direction on a particular legal or policy issue. Cases such as Roncarelli v 
Duplessis have demonstrated the consequences of arbitrary exercises of executive 
power and the role of judicial remedies in preventing “absolute and untrammeled 
‘discretion’”16 from undermining the rule of law and eroding public trust in 
government institutions and officials. Despite the broad scope of authority and 
discretion afforded to executive actors, courts are often reluctant to impose 
substantive remedies for fear of disrupting the separation of powers doctrine.17 
However, in a rising tide of populism and mistrust in judicial decision-
making, it is increasingly important that judicial remedies serve as an effective 
 
14 See First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Canada (Attorney General), 
2016 CHRT 2 [2016 FNCFCS Decision]; 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 and 
2019 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 4. 
15 Forcese et al, supra note 12 at 299. 
16 [1959] SCR 121 at 140. 
17 This is particularly true when exercises of Crown prerogative power are in question. 
See Philippe Lagasse, “Parliamentary and judicial ambivalence towards executive 
prerogative powers” (2012) 55:2 Canadian Public Administration 157 at 159. 
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safeguard against illegal or arbitrary exercises of executive power.18 The 
relationship between the executive branches at both the provincial and federal 
level—and their respective relationships with courts—has become increasingly 
adversarial, with more political leaders demonstrating an increased willingness to 
engage the notwithstanding clause if their decisions face a Charter challenge.19 
While some may argue that this type of adversarialism between executive actors 
and courts is “dialogue theory” in action, it risks conflicting with the first principle 
of the rule of law articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada—that the law is 
supreme over both private individuals and government officials, the latter of 
whom must exercise their authority in a non-arbitrary way.20  
Courts also have an important role in ensuring executive actors respond 
“promptly and in good faith” to judicial remedies, even if those remedies are not 
consistent with the executive’s political interests.21 There are numerous examples 
of Canadian cases that resulted in overt executive inaction in response to judicial 
remedies.22 In Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, the Supreme Court of Canada 
declared that Canada contributed to Mr. Khadr’s ongoing detention, depriving 
him of his right to liberty and security of person under section 7 of the Charter.23 
While the Court hesitated to exercise further remedial discretion due to the nature 
of the prerogative powers exercised, the Crown decided not to remedy the Charter 
breach because they had “no political motive to do anything that might benefit, 
or even appear to benefit, Omar Khadr.”24 However, cases such as Canada 
 
18 Kent Roach, “Dialogue in Canada and the Dangers of Simplified Comparative Law 
and Populism” in Geoffrey Sigalet, Gregoire Webber & Rosalind Dixon, eds, 
Constitutional dialogue: rights, democracy, institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2019) 267 at 307 [Roach, “Dialogue in Canada”]. 
19 Ibid at 294. Recent examples of adversarialism include Quebec’s use of the 
notwithstanding clause to pass Bill 21 (which restricts public servants from wearing 
religious symbols in the workplace) and Ontario’s threatened use of the notwithstanding 
clause to defend their decision to reduce the size of Toronto City Council. 
20 Reference re Language Rights Under s 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s 133 of Constitution Act, 
1867, [1985] 1 SCR 721 at para 59 [Manitoba Language Rights Reference]. 
21 Roach, “Dialogue in Canada” supra note 18 at 304. 
22 See Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3 [Khadr]; Little Sisters v Canada, [2007] 2 
SCR 28. 
23 Khadr, supra note 22 at para 48. 
24 Audrey Macklin, “Comment on Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr (2010)” (2010) 51 
SCLR 295 at 327; see also Roach, “Dialogue in Canada” supra note 18 at 305. 
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(Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society do demonstrate that very explicit 
judicial remedies, such as the order of mandamus to exempt the safe-injection 
facility Insite from the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, can facilitate an 
expedient government response despite political or ideological opposition.25 
When courts can impose meaningful judicial remedies for executive action—and 
ensure that those remedies are acted upon—the integrity of the rule of law can 
be preserved effectively.  
III. INDICIA OF MEANINGFUL REMEDIES FOR 
EXECUTIVE ACTION 
In public law litigation, the dispute is often a grievance about “the operation 
of public policy”26 rather than a private transaction or relationship. As a result, 
courts must apply different considerations to ensure that a remedy for executive 
action provides meaningful redress for affected individuals and the general public. 
In the absence of a clear analytical framework, Canadian courts have often 
considered remedies in an ad hoc, context-specific manner, without the benefit 
of explicit indicia to provide clarity and predictability in such a complex area of 
administrative law. As a starting point, Cane has proposed two potential indicia 
of meaningful remedies: (a) whether the remedy can be used to hold public bodies 
accountable and enforce compliance; and (b) whether the remedy can effectively 
change bureaucratic behaviour at a systemic level.27 However, Cane’s indicia fail 
 
25 2011 SCC 44; Kirk Makin, Sunny Dhillon and Ingrid Peritz, “Supreme Court ruling 
opens doors to drug injection clinics across Canada”, Globe and Mail (2011), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/supreme-court-ruling-opens-
doors-to-drug-injection-clinics-across-canada/article4182250>. 
26 Chayes, supra note 6 at 1302. 
27 Peter Cane, “Administrative Law as Regulation” in Christine Parker, Colin Scott, 
Nicola Lacey and John Braithwaite, eds, Regulating Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004) 207 at 221. Cane’s discussion of behaviour change focuses on the 
procedural dimensions of public decision-making (e.g., whether decisions were made 
fairly, openly, and transparently and whether bureaucratic discretion is appropriately 
exercised), noting that many empirical researchers have failed to establish a causal 
connection between judicial review remedies and changes in bureaucratic behaviour. 
For the purposes of this paper, I distinguish between procedural fairness and behaviour 
modification in public officials.  
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to explore whether public law remedies may, in certain circumstances, have an 
important role in influencing the “frameworks, structures and system design” that 
inform executive action—what I describe as “systemic change”.28 Systemic 
change is about how remedies improve future exercises of executive power. In 
this section, I incorporate Sunkin’s concept of systemic change with Cane’s 
framework to develop three key indicia of meaningful remedies for executive 
action: (1) accountability and enforceability; (2) behaviour change (both individual 
and institutional); and (3) systemic change. These indicia are complementary and 
mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive: remedies that hold executive 
actors accountable can be a tool to prompt longer-term behaviour and systemic 
change and enforcement mechanisms may be required to facilitate this process. 
In many cases, changing individual and institutional behaviour is integral to 
achieve broader systemic change.   
These indicia should not be interpreted as a definitive or closed list. They 
are intended to provide a framework to explore the potential and scope of 
remedial discretion for exercises of executive power within the bounds of judicial 
legitimacy. In some cases, awarding monetary damages or remitting a decision 
back to an administrative tribunal for re-hearing may be sufficient to rectify the 
wrongdoing and systemic changes may not be required. In other cases, a 
meaningful remedy may be one that facilitates expedient action from public 
officials due to the time sensitivity of the matter (e.g., refugee protection claims 
or habeas corpus applications). However, much of the public law litigation that 
focuses on executive action exposes broader systemic issues about how public 
power is “allocated, exercised and controlled.”29 As a result, courts may be 
required to identify remedies for executive action that are more systemic in nature 
to address the power imbalance between citizens and the state.  
 
 
28 Maurice Sunkin, “Conceptual Issues in Researching the Impact of Judicial Review on 
Government Bureaucracies” in Marc Hertogh and Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial Review 
and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) 43 at 60.  
29 Peter Cane, “Executive Primacy, Populism and Public Law” (2019) 28:2 Pac Rim L & 
Pol’y J 527 at 527. 
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Accountability and Enforceability 
Meaningful judicial remedies serve to uphold the rule of law and prevent 
abuses of power. This is done by providing a measure of accountability and 
enforceability in dispute resolution that is otherwise unavailable through political 
processes.30 On its own, political constitutionalism provides “imperfect 
accountability” because governments can exercise their political power to 
advantage or disadvantage particular groups, provided that those policy choices 
align with the majority of their electorate.31 In contrast,  judicial remedies can 
provide accountability by focusing the court’s attention on a set of particular 
circumstances, applying a process of principled reasoning based on pre-existing 
standards and providing an established level of competence in rule interpretation 
and procedural fairness.32 Moreover, the public nature of judicial decision-
making—with the opportunity to hear from all affected parties and third party 
interveners—provides an important formal exercise of accountability.33 Courts 
and tribunals also have a duty to give reasons, providing a transparent public 
record of whether the Crown’s action in dispute fell within the bounds of its legal 
authority. 
Depending on the nature of the dispute and the scope of the adjudicator’s 
jurisdiction, supervisory orders can be used in Canada as a remedial tool to hold 
executive actors accountable.34 While administrative tribunals “have stronger 
theoretical justifications for remaining seized of a case over a longer period of 
time” 35 due to the nature of their polycentric decision-making, courts can also 
act in a supervisory capacity to ensure that a remedy is granted. In the Manitoba 
 
30 Jeff King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 60. 
31 Forcese et al, supra note 12 at 12.   
32 King, supra note 30 at 60-61. 
33 Ibid at 61-62. 
34 Some legal scholars have argued that suspended declarations of invalidity are more 
consistent with the separation of powers doctrine (see Janet E Minor & James S F 
Wilson, “Reflections of a Supervisory Order Sceptic: Ten Years after Doucet-Boudreau” in 
Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, eds, Taking Remedies Seriously (Ottawa: Canadian 
Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2009) 303 at 303. 
35 Cristie Ford, “Remedies in Canadian Administrative Law: A Roadmap to a Parallel 
Legal Universe” in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 
3rd ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2018) 43 at 49. 
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Language Rights Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered special hearings 
to be arranged at the request of the Attorneys General of Canada or Manitoba to 
monitor the translation, re-enactment, printing, and publishing of Manitoban 
statutes.36 As a result, the Supreme Court of Canada retained jurisdiction of the 
matter for nearly a decade, issuing new follow-up judgments about the timing and 
extent of the translation process.37  
While accountability focuses on supervising the implementation of judicial 
remedies, enforcement focuses on mandating the implementation of judicial 
remedies and applying penalties for non-compliance. In both cases, the 
implementation of the required action (e.g., payment of damages or policy 
change) remains squarely within the scope of the legislative and executive branch. 
Administrative tribunals are limited to the scope of enforcement power that is 
identified in their enabling statute, provided that such power is constitutionally 
valid.38 Tribunals often seek enforcement of their orders via court application, 
which allows the tribunal to use judicial enforcement mechanisms (e.g., holding 
a party in contempt or pursuing quasi-criminal prosecution).39  
Enforcing mandatory actions as a remedy against the Crown can be very 
challenging for litigants due to the limitations of Crown liability legislation, 
regardless of whether the judgment was issued by an administrative tribunal or a 
court.40 Parties generally cannot seek injunctive relief or specific performance 
against the Crown; the federal Crown Liability and Proceedings Act requires courts to 
order declaratory relief against the Crown in lieu of injunctions or specific 
performance in an effort to preserve the separation of powers.41 However, 
 
36 Manitoba Language Rights Reference, supra note 20 at para 152. 
37 Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender, “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: 
When is it Appropriate, Just and Equitable?” (2005) 122 South African LJ 325 at 340. 
See Doucet-Boudreau, supra note 5 for another example of courts acting in a supervisory 
function. 
38 Ford, supra note 35 at 56. 
39 Ibid at 57. 
40 In this section, I use the federal Crown Liability and Proceedings Act as an example 
(recognizing that provincial Crown liability legislation also exists for actions against the 
provincial Crown). 
41 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50, s 22(1) [Crown Liability and 
Proceedings Act]; Robert Sharpe, Injunctions and specific performance (Toronto: Thomson 
Reuters Canada, 2017) (loose-leaf updated 2018, release 27) at para 3.1040. 
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injunctive relief can typically be awarded against Ministers or Crown servants 
unlawfully exercising statutory powers.42 The Crown can be held liable for court-
ordered damages, and if a litigant receives a certificate of judgment against the 
Crown, the Minister of Finance is directed to authorize the payment out of the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund.43 While the statutory language for the payment of 
judgments is a directive on the Minister of Finance, parties cannot execute on the 
judgment against the Crown as a judgment creditor if the Crown does not 
comply.44 Parties typically cannot hold the Crown itself in contempt, unless the 
order was made against an officer or servant of the Crown.45 These limitations 
illustrate that while tribunals and courts can hold executive actors accountable, it 
can be difficult to enforce for non-compliance. 
Behaviour Change 
Judicial remedies may also be needed to change individual and institutional 
behaviours, guiding how executive power is exercised in the future. In this 
section, I draw a distinction between individual and institutional behaviour 
change and explore how various remedies might achieve different types of 
outcomes. Individual and institutional behaviour change are related concepts; 
individuals can shape the culture of their organization through their conduct or 
change their behaviour as a result of new policies or practices implemented at the 
institutional level. Unfortunately, there is limited research in Canada on how 
different types of remedies directly influence behaviour change among public 
officials and the institutions in which they operate. Often, this is a question of 
attribution—whether we can attribute institutional behaviour change to the 
 
42 Sharpe, supra note 41 at para 3.1050. The Crown servant’s act must give rise to 
personal liability to proceed (Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, supra note 41, s 10).  
43 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, supra note 41 at s 30(1). 
44 Ibid at ss 3, 29. See Hughes v Canada (Human Rights Commission), 2019 FC 53 for a recent 
discussion of the limitations on executing judgments against the Crown.  
45 Peter W Hogg, Patrick J Monahan & Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown, 4th ed 
(Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada, 2011) at 82-83. 
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judicial remedy itself, the policy/legislation that results from the judicial decision, 
or the implementation efforts of public officials.46  
The potential for a judicial remedy to change individual or institutional 
behaviour is often influenced by a litigant’s choice of procedure and the nature 
of the claim. From a procedural perspective, class action lawsuits (compared to 
individual lawsuits) are one of the most established routes for prompting 
behaviour change in public law litigation because the remedies are awarded to the 
class a whole, forcing governments to internalize the costs of the harm they 
created on a larger scale.47 Litigants can also influence behaviour change by 
pursuing claims against the Crown with either a procedural or substantive nature. 
Behaviour change at a procedural level focuses on changing how public officials 
and institutions exercise discretion when administering processes by ensuring 
they act reasonably, fairly, and transparently. In contrast, changing behaviour at a 
substantive level focuses on ensuring public officials and institutions make 
appropriate decisions that are within the scope of their legal authority.  
At the individual level, behaviour change is reflected in the behaviour or 
conduct of public officials. Unlike private individuals or private firms, public 
officials are less likely to respond as rational economic actors with the intent of 
maximizing wealth.48 Public officials can also effectively externalize remedial 
costs through delay by taking advantage of the short-term nature of electoral 
cycles.49 When monetary damages are awarded to plaintiffs, it is taxpayers— not 
public officials—who ultimately internalize the cost of wrongdoing.50 When 
courts issue decisions or orders, it can be challenging for public officials to 
translate that judicial guidance to the level of front-line discretionary decision-
making.51 Often, judicial guidance is translated into soft law (e.g., policy or 
 
46 Bradley C Canon & Charles A Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact 
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1999) at 190. 
47 Craig Jones & Angela Baxter, “The Class Action and Public Authority Liability: 
Preferability Re-examined” (2007) 57 UNBLJ 27 at 33. 
48 Ibid at 33-34. 
49 Ibid at 36. 
50 Ibid at 37-38. 
51 Lorne Sossin, “The Politics of Soft Law: How Judicial Decisions Influence 
Bureaucratic Discretion in Canada” in Marc Hertogh & Simon Halliday, eds, Judicial 
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procedure manuals) to influence how front-line public officials exercise their 
discretion.52 Sossin observed in several Canadian judicial review case studies that 
judicial decision-making can have a significant impact on how front-line public 
officials exercise their discretion, but that impact occurs “not as quickly, as 
comprehensively or as coherently as litigants and the courts would wish.”53 
Judicial guidance may also inadvertently instruct frontline officials how to 
describe their reasons in a manner that is compliant with the court’s approach to 
avoid future judicial review but fails to address the underlying bias or 
discrimination that may exist.54  
Institutional behaviour change is reflected in the policies and practices of 
the organization’s operations, influencing the conduct of individual public 
officials. At the institutional level, behaviour change is influenced by several key 
factors: (1) policy tensions between the judicial order and the agency’s core 
mandate or function; (2) inertia; (3) political factors; and (4) community 
pressure.55 Political science professor Bradley Canon noted that the extent of 
institutional “behavioural adjustment” that occurs after a judicial decision has 
been issued largely depends on the “acceptance decision” of the agency leader—
a psychological reaction that perceives the decision to be positive, negative, or 
neutral.56 If the agency’s leader reacts strongly to the judicial decision (positive or 
negative), it is more likely that the leader will maximize the institution’s efforts to 
implement the decision or minimize their effort to comply.57 In some cases, 
remedies that facilitate institutional behaviour change may overlap with systemic 
changes, discussed below.  
 
Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 129 at 130. 
52 Ibid at 159. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid at 151. 
55 Bradley C Canon, “Studying Bureaucratic Implementation of Judicial Policies in the 
United States: Conceptual and Methodological Approaches” in Marc Hertogh & Simon 
Halliday, eds, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Impact: International and Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 76 at 95-96. While Bradley 
Canon’s research focuses on the American perspective, his observations are also 
relevant to the Canadian context. 
56 Ibid at 80. 
57 Ibid at 81. 
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Systemic Change 
Accountability, enforceability, and behaviour change may demonstrate that 
a judicial remedy provides meaningful redress for individual plaintiffs or classes 
of plaintiffs, but they do not necessarily reflect whether a judicial remedy can 
achieve longer-term systemic change. Human rights scholars Gwen Brodsky, 
Shelagh Day, and Frances Kelly note some examples of systemic change that 
could be achieved through judicial remedies. This includes mandating reporting 
requirements as part of a supervisory order, providing training for frontline staff, 
or requiring governments to review all relevant legislation within a particular 
timeframe to ensure it is human rights compliant.58 While some administrative 
bodies have the inherent authority to grant systemic remedies based on their 
governing statutes,59 courts often have to address systemic policy/legislative 
change more indirectly through judicial review remedies or monetary damages.60 
Kent Roach argued that the executive and legislative branches of government are 
likely to expedite the process of developing systemic remedies if they are subject 
to significant public pressure or the individual remedies awarded by courts are 
particularly costly.61 
At the administrative tribunal level, the nature of systemic remedies can vary 
significantly based on the scope of authority articulated in their enabling 
legislation. In many cases, administrative tribunals have a broader mandate than 
courts and can leverage a broader range of remedial tools to adjudicate disputes.62 
However, in Moore v British Columbia (Education), the Supreme Court of Canada 
clarified that while administrative bodies can provide remedies for individual 
claimants that have a systemic impact, they cannot award systemic remedies that 
are too remote from the scope of the complaint (e.g., ordering specific 
 
58 Brodsky, Day & Kelly, supra note 8 at 45-46. 
59 See ibid at 29. 
60 In individual or class actions, monetary damages may serve to “attract media attention 
and the attention of defendant governments” (Lorne Sossin, “Class Actions against the 
Crown: A Substitution for Judicial Review on Administrative Law Grounds” (2007) 57 
UNBLJ 9 at 16). However, increased attention may not always translate into meaningful 
legislative or policy change.  
61 Kent Roach, “Dialogic remedies” (2019) 17:3 Int’l J Constitutional L 860 at 873. 
62 Ford, supra note 35 at 49. 
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government funding allocations).63 Courts are often more constrained than 
administrative tribunals in their remedial discretion and more reticent to award 
systemic remedies due to the separation of powers doctrine. Courts are highly 
respectful of institutional roles. Remedies that affect budgetary priorities or policy 
choices are typically the exception, not the rule.64 
The Ontario Human Rights Board of Inquiry decision McKinnon v Ontario 
(Correctional Services) demonstrates some of these challenges when enforcing 
systemic remedies.65 In McKinnon, the Board of Inquiry held that Mr. McKinnon 
experienced discrimination and harassment on the basis of his Aboriginal 
ancestry. The Board of Inquiry awarded monetary damages, an order for public 
notices, and a human rights training program for staff.66 When the Government 
of Ontario employer failed to implement the remedies, additional systemic 
remedies were ordered, including training for ministry and facility management 
and the appointment of a third-party consultant.67 In 2011, after numerous 
decisions and 13 years after the initial Board of Inquiry decision, the Tribunal 
argued in the Ontario Divisional Court that the Deputy Minister should be held 
in contempt.68 After the settlement, the Ontario Human Rights Commission and 
relevant ministries in the Government of Ontario signed a three-year Human 
Rights Project with clear mechanisms for accountability.69 McKinnon is an 
extraordinary example of the challenges administrative tribunals can face when 




63 2012 SCC 61 at paras 57, 63, 64. 
64 Roach, Constitutional remedies, supra note 11 at 3.790. 
65 [1998] OHRBID No 10 [1998 McKinnon Decision]. The Ontario Human Rights Board 
of Inquiry is now called the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal. 
66 Ibid at para 360. 
67 McKinnon v Ontario (Correctional Services), [2002] OHRBID No 22 at para 311. 
68 McKinnon v Ontario (Correctional Services), 2011 HRTO 263 [2011 McKinnon Decision]. 
69 Ford, supra note 35 at 54. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES OF REMEDIES FOR EXECUTIVE 
ACTION 
It is unlikely that tribunal or court-ordered remedies for executive action will 
fulfill all three indicia outlined by Cane and Sunkin. In this section, I develop two 
case studies to illustrate the challenges of implementing meaningful remedies in 
practice. After discussing the history of the litigation using tribunal/court 
decisions and various secondary sources, I evaluate the remedies based on the 
three indicia discussed: (1) accountability and enforceability; (2) behaviour change 
(both individual and institutional); and (3) systemic change. In Kanthasamy, these 
principles are explored in the context of litigation between an individual plaintiff 
and administrative executive actors (immigration officers in Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada) as a judicial review application. In First Nations Child and 
Family Caring Society, these principles are applied to litigation between a class of 
plaintiffs and a political executive body (the Minister of Indigenous Services 
Canada)70 before a human rights tribunal. Both cases expose important tensions 
between courts, tribunals, and the Crown in how judicial remedies are ordered 
and enforced. 
The legal issues and remedial outcomes in both case studies differ 
significantly, but they share several key similarities. Both cases focus on providing 
just outcomes and equitable treatment for marginalized children experiencing 
discrimination using domestic or international human rights frameworks. Both 
cases discuss the human rights principle of “best interests of the child.” First 
Nations Child and Family Caring Society does so from a domestic perspective by 
focusing on Jordan’s Principle and the majority in Kanthasamy explores the 
concept using the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and non-binding 
child asylum guidelines from the United Nations High Commissioner for 
 
70 This name reflects the department’s current name, which has changed numerous 
times since the start of the litigation. Throughout this case study, I refer to the 
department based on its name at the time the decision was issued. 
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Refugees.71 Both cases also identify critical flaws in how government systems 
(First Nations child welfare and immigration/refugee protection) operate and, in 
doing so, shifted public discourse about the role of administrative tribunals and 
courts in addressing systemic inequality.   
Kanthasamy v Canada (Attorney General) 
Kanthasamy v Canada (Attorney General) is a case about the scope of 
humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) considerations for children seeking 
refugee protection in Canada. At the time of trial, Mr. Kanthasamy was a 16-year-
old adolescent from Sri Lanka who was denied refugee protection from 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada on the basis that Sri Lankan authorities had 
taken steps to address the persecution facing Tamils and Mr. Kanthasamy himself 
was not immediately at risk.72 At the time of Mr. Kanthasamy’s refugee protection 
application, the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board 
was not yet established; therefore, Mr. Kanthasamy was required to apply directly 
for judicial review.73 Mr. Kanthasamy’s judicial review application for a 
reassessment on H&C grounds was denied on the basis that his return to Sri 
Lanka would not result in “hardship that was unusual and undeserved or 
disproportionate.”74 However, the Federal Court certified the question of how 
the nature of “risk” should be assessed under section 25 of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act.75 On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Mr. 
Kanthasamy’s appeal and held that the immigration officer’s interpretation of 
section 25 was reasonable in the circumstances.76 
 
71 2016 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 14 at para 346; Kanthasamy, supra note 13 at paras 
37-39. See also Dan Moore, “Engagement with Human Rights by Administrative 
Decision-Makers: A Transformative Opportunity to Build a More Grassroots Human 
Rights Culture” (2017) 49:1 Ottawa L Rev 131 at 147.  
72 2013 FC 802 at para 1 [Kanthasamy Trial Decision]. 
73 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Refugee appeals” (15 March 2019), 
online: <irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/refugee-appeals/Pages/index.aspx>; Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, s 72(1). 
74 Kanthasamy Trial Decision, supra note 72 at para 3.  
75 Ibid at paras 67-74. 
76 Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at para 4 [Kanthasamy 
FCA Decision]. 
18 REMEDIES MATTER Vol. 30 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada heard Mr. Kanthasamy’s case in 2015, finding 
the immigration officer’s decision unreasonable.77 Justice Abella, writing for the 
majority, held that the immigration officer failed to make a holistic determination 
of Mr. Kanthasamy’s H&C grounds by cumulatively assessing the hardship 
factors.78 Justice Abella held that immigration officers should not treat the soft 
law Ministerial Guidelines as mandatory requirements and the “unusual and 
undeserved or disproportionate” hardship requirement as a set of distinct legal 
thresholds.79 Immigration officers are also required to consider the “best interests 
of the child” principle in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.80 The majority set aside the immigration officer’s decision and 
remitted the matter back to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for 
consideration.81 Unfortunately, Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s post-
Kanthasamy decision is not publicly available and Mr. Kanthasamy’s immigration 
status is currently unknown.   
Accountability and Enforceability 
By remitting the issue back to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for re-
consideration, the Supreme Court of Canada opted not to introduce oversight or 
enforcement mechanisms as part of their remedy in Kanthasamy. Consistent with 
the principles of administrative law, the Supreme Court of Canada deferred to 
the authority of the executive actor (immigration officers) to revisit Mr. 
Kanthasamy’s case using the common law principles articulated by the Court. 
While this principle is based in the separation of powers doctrine, it can create 
underwhelming results for plaintiffs if the administrative decision-maker repeats 
their actions or fails to account for the judicial direction provided by the Court.82 
Unfortunately, without Citizenship and Immigration’s reconsidered decision, it is 
difficult to evaluate whether the Board effectively adopted the Supreme Court of 
 
77 Kanthasamy, supra note 13 at para 61. 
78 Ibid at para 28. 
79 Ibid at paras 32, 60. 
80 Ibid at paras 34, 37. 
81 Kanthasamy, supra note 13 at para 64. If Kanthasamy’s case was reheard by the 
Immigration and Refugee Board, the subsequent decision is not publicly available. 
82 Forcese et al, supra note 12 at 564. 
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Canada’s direction for how to interpret the best interests of the child in Mr. 
Kanthasamy’s application. 
Behaviour Change 
Despite the lack of accountability or enforcement mechanisms, Kanthasamy 
is an important example of how courts can provide a strong signal—without 
being overly prescriptive—that institutional behaviour change is needed. Similar 
to Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Kanthasamy provided judicial guidance for how to interpret and apply 
the Ministry’s non-binding soft law guidelines when exercising discretion, but did 
not direct specific amendments to binding legislation or policy.83 In addition to 
informing the soft law guidelines, the Supreme Court of Canada also provided a 
clear analytical framework for immigration officers to apply when reviewing H&C 
decisions that engage the best interests of the child.84 Shortly after the decision 
was released, some immigration lawyers described evidence of behavioural 
change at the institutional level. This included observations of how Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada and the Immigration and Refugee Board dealt with 
H&C cases from a procedural perspective, noting that “pending judicial review 
applications [were] consented to [and] refused humanitarian applications [were] 
re-opened.”85 These institutional changes demonstrate that Kanthasamy may have 
had a positive impact on executive action, at least in the short term. 
However, post-Kanthasamy the actions of individual immigration officers in 
judicial review decisions have not consistently reflected these observations about 
institutional behaviour change. In the years following the release of the 
Kanthasamy decision, the Federal Court judicially reviewed numerous Citizenship 
and Immigration decisions where immigration officers failed to comply with the 
 
83 See Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
84 See Lu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 175; Cerezo v Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2016 FC 1224; Li v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 
FC 451.  
85 Ron Poulton, “Kanthasamy and the spring cleaning of immigration law” Canadian 
Lawyer (2016), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/kanthasamy-and-
the-spring-cleaning-of-immigration-law/270057>. 
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best interests of the child framework.86 In several cases, the Federal Court 
described the reasons provided by immigration officers as “run[ning] afoul of the 
teachings from Kanthasamy”87 or “fail[ing] … to show any compassionate 
consideration that goes beyond the strict hardship lens.”88 It may be unreasonable 
to expect that the Kanthasamy principles would be adopted and reasonably 
considered by immigration officers in all cases. However, the number of recent 
decisions that disregard the best interests of children framework indicates that 
Kanthasamy may not have resulted in the individual behaviour change that was 
intended.  
Systemic Change 
As a judicial review application, the Federal Court, Federal Court of Appeal, 
and Supreme Court of Canada were limited in their ability to impose systemic 
remedies. However, Mr. Kanthasamy’s case has indirectly impacted how 
immigration officers evaluate H&C grounds and incorporate the best interests of 
children when reviewing refugee protection cases. The judicial direction in 
Kanthasamy resulted in updated policies for Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
when assessing H&C applications. These updates included considering hardship 
in the context of H&C applications, applying the H&C threshold of proof, 
incorporating best interests of the child, and balancing consistency and 
discretion.89 These policy changes are soft law and therefore not legally binding. 
 
86 See Lopez Cobo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 349; Babfunmi v Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 151; Aguirre Renteria v Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2019 FC 133; Skinner v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 3; 
Cojuhari v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1009 and Dowers v Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 889 for a recent sample of IRB decisions that were 
remitted back to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for reconsideration for failing to 
follow the Supreme Court’s direction in Kanthasamy. To draw a reasonable inference 
about behaviour change, I reviewed Federal Court decisions when the immigration 
officer’s decisions was issued after the Kanthasamy decision.  
87 Skinner v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 3 at para 53. 
88 Yanchak v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 117 at para 17. 
89 Government of Canada, “Program delivery update – March 2, 2016: update to 
guidance on humanitarian and compassionate consideration” (2016), online: 
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-
manuals/operational-bulletins-manuals/updates/2016-03-02.html>. 
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Yet, they provide clear direction for immigration officers to change their practices 
by approaching H&C discretion with greater flexibility and assessing “hardship” 
holistically by using a broad range of non-exhaustive factors.90 However, as noted 
previously, subsequent judicial review of Citizenship and Immigration decisions 
demonstrated that these policy changes did not always result in behaviour change 
for frontline immigration officials.  
First Nations Child and Family Caring Society v Canada (Attorney General) 
In 2011, the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society (FNCFCS) filed 
a complaint at the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal claiming that 54,000 First 
Nations children living on-reserve were not receiving adequate child welfare 
funding compared to their non-Indigenous counterparts.91 FNCFCS argued that 
chronic underfunding resulted in culturally inappropriate service delivery and a 
“systemic discriminatory impact” for First Nations children. They requested a 
Tribunal order for an annual funding increase of $109 million from Indigenous 
and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) to address the funding shortfall.92 The 
Tribunal dismissed the complaint on the basis of an inadequate evidentiary 
record, but re-visited the matter after the Federal Court granted three applications 
for judicial review and set aside the Tribunal’s decision.93 After numerous 
motions about procedural issues and allegations of retaliation directed towards 
FNCFCS advocate Dr. Cindy Blackstock, the matter was finally reheard by the 
Tribunal in 2013/2014. A decision was rendered in 2016. The Tribunal found 
that Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) was 
discriminating against First Nations on-reserve children.94 The Tribunal ordered 
AANDC to cease its discriminatory practices, reform the child welfare funding 
model, and apply the “full meaning and scope” of Jordan’s Principle, according 
 
90 Judith Boer, “H&C Update Following the SCC Kanthasamy Decision” Continuing 
Legal Education Society of British Columbia (2016), online: </www.cle.bc.ca/practice-
point/human-rights/hc-update-following-scc-kanthasamy-decision> at 4.1.3. 
91 2011 CHRT 4 at para 21 [2011 FNCFCS Decision]. 
92 Ibid at para 21. 
93 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Canada (Attorney General), 
2012 CHRT 16 at para 4.  
94 2016 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 14 at para 466.  
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to which First Nations children are supposed to be able to access the social, 
health, educational, and other services they need in a timely manner.95  
Disappointingly, this case was not resolved by the orders outlined in the 
2016 decision and the Tribunal continues to maintain its jurisdiction over the 
matter. The Tribunal issued subsequent orders directing AANDC in its 
implementation of Jordan’s Principle96 and heard new motions from FNCFCS 
alleging AANDC’s non-compliance with the remedial orders.97 In its non-
compliance decision, the Tribunal noted that it is “not interested in drafting 
policies, choosing between policies, supervising policy-drafting or unnecessarily 
embarking on the specifics of reform.”98 The Tribunal then ordered additional 
remedies to the 2016 decision, requiring AANDC to conduct needs assessments 
with First Nations agencies, develop alternative funding systems (in recognition 
that longer-term funding reform was underway), and evaluate its progress (with 
specific timelines for reporting back to the Tribunal).99 The Tribunal has since 
issued decisions providing guidance to AANDC on how to define “essential 
service,” “service gap,” “unreasonable delay” and the category of First Nations 
children eligible for coverage under Jordan’s Principle and how to implement the 
compensation framework.100 
To enforce the remedies, the Tribunal indicated that it may be required to 
maintain jurisdiction (similar to McKinnon) to facilitate meaningful 
implementation.101 In 2019, the Tribunal issued another decision following up on 
the parties’ submissions about compensation. The 2019 decision ordered $20,000 
(plus interest) payable to each First Nations child and to each First Nations parent 
or grandparent of children that were removed from their home between January 
1, 2006 and the earliest of when the discrimination has ceased, the date the parties 
 
95 Ibid at para 481. 
96 See 2016 CHRT 10, 2017 CHRT 14 and 2017 CHRT 35.  
97 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1. 
98 Ibid at para 48. 
99 Ibid at paras 407-450. 
100 See 2020 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 4; 2020 CHRT 15; 2020 CHRT 20; 2020 
CHRT 36; 2021 CHRT 6;  2021 CHRT 7. 
101 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 at para 388. 
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settle the agreement, or the date the Tribunal ceases to retain jurisdiction.102 The 
Attorney General of Canada filed an application for judicial review with the 
Federal Court and requested a stay of the Tribunal’s compensation ruling.103 The 
Federal Court denied the Attorney General’s application for a stay and denied the 
FNCFCS’s motion to stay the Attorney General’s judicial review. The decision 
concluded that the possibility of a future judicial review may incentivize the 
parties to negotiate and expedite their discussions.104  
Accountability and Enforceability 
The protracted First Nations Child and Family Caring Society case has clearly 
tested the boundaries of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s remedial 
jurisdiction—particularly on issues of accountability and enforceability. In its 
2018 FNCFCS decision, the Tribunal stated that “the rule of law is directly 
dependent on the ability of the Tribunal to enforce its process and maintain 
respect for remedial orders otherwise the CHRA is meaningless as a tool to 
eliminate discrimination.”105 The 2019 FNCFCS decision was the Tribunal’s 
eighth non-compliance order, and enforcement issues have continued as the 
Attorney General of Canada maintains that the  decisions should be quashed.106 
The Tribunal has expressed concern that the Attorney General has opted for non-
compliance, noting that “no party can unilaterally elect to simply not-comply with 
 
102 2019 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 4 at paras 245, 275. The Tribunal rejected the 
argument that compensation should not be awarded on the basis that First Nations 
children may also receive monetary damages through a certified class action in Federal 
Court or a claim for Charter damages (para 205).  
103 Canada (Attorney General) v First Nations Child and Family Caring Society (2019), 
Application for Judicial Review, online: 
<fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/federal_court_document_t-1621-19.pdf> 
[2019 AG Application for Judicial Review] (the application has been ordered into case 
management).  
104 Canada (Attorney General) v First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada, 2019 
FC 1529 at paras 32-33 [2019 FNCFCS FC Decision]. 
105 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 at para 89. 
106 2019 AG Application for Judicial Review, supra note 103. 
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Tribunal orders.”107 The judicial review was heard in Federal Court from June 14-
18, 2021.108 
The CHRT has not yet exercised the full extent of its statutory enforcement 
powers in this case. Under section 57 of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA), 
the Tribunal can file an order with the Federal Court to apply court enforcement 
remedies.109 The CHRA allows the Tribunal itself to engage the Federal Court’s 
enforcement powers to hold parties in contempt for failing to comply.110 
However, contempt is not available when the non-complying party is the Crown 
as an executive body (e.g., a ministry or department).111 As was the case in 
McKinnon, in certain cases it may be possible to attribute institutional 
responsibility to senior public officials, such as Deputy Ministers, if their actions 
were contemptuous in nature (e.g., withholding documents).112 If the Attorney 
General’s application for judicial review is unsuccessful, the Tribunal may be able 
to exercise its remedial discretion (similar to McKinnon) to request the Federal 
Court hold senior public officials in contempt for their non-compliance.113 
Behaviour Change 
On November 25, 2019, the Attorney General of Canada and the Minister 
of Indigenous Services made an unexpected announcement: the Government of 
Canada was committed to “seeking a comprehensive settlement on 
 
107 Letter from Judy Dubois, Registry Officer, Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (27 
November 2019), online (pdf): 
<fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/2019.11.27._lt_fc_registry_chrt_deadline_exte
nsion.pdf>. 
108 Brett Forester, “Feds submit arguments to overturn ‘unreasonable’ and ‘egregious’ 
CHRT rulings” APTN (12 March 2021), online: <www.aptnnews.ca/national-
news/feds-argue-discrimination-not-ongoing-chrt>.  
109 Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 57. 
110 Warman v Tremaine, 2011 FCA 297 at para 44; Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106, ss 
424(1), 425. 
111 Hogg, Monahan & Wright, supra note 45 at 82-83; 2011 McKinnon Decision, supra 
note 68 at para 64. 
112 2011 McKinnon Decision, supra note 68 at para 168. 
113 Ibid at para 186. 
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compensation” for the underfunding of child welfare services on-reserve.114 
While the announcement cited the advocacy efforts of the FNCFCS and the 
CHRT decisions, the impetus was another legal proceeding: a six billion dollar 
class action for First Nations children affected by the on-reserve child welfare 
system between 1991–2019 with two lead plaintiffs, Jeremy Meawasige and 
Xavier Moushoom.115 Meawasige is a representative of the Jordan’s Principle class 
in the proceeding, after the Government of Canada denied funding for him to 
receive treatment for cerebral palsy, spinal curvature, and autism in Pictou 
Landing First Nation in Nova Scotia. Moushoom is advancing the class action 
based on his experience living in 14 foster homes between the ages of 9–18. If 
the class action results in a settlement, the two proceedings would not be mutually 
exclusive: First Nations children affected by the on-reserve child welfare system 
could seek compensation from both the CHRT proceeding and the class action 
settlement.116 Shortly thereafter, the Assembly of First Nations also commenced 
a class action lawsuit seeking $10B in damages on behalf of First Nations children 
impacted by Jordan’s Principle.117 Both Meawasige and Moushoom’s class action 
and the Assembly of First Nations class action have been certified by the Federal 
Court. 
The behaviour change outcomes between the class actions and the CHRT 
decisions are markedly different. The scope of the class actions is also broader 
 
114 Indigenous Services Canada, News Release, “Joint Statement by the Minister of 
Indigenous Services and the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada on 




115 Jorge Barrera, “Ottawa in talks to settle First Nations child welfare class action 
lawsuit” CBC News (4 November 2019), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/challenge-child-welfare-lawsuit-1.5343818> [Barrera, 
“Ottawa in talks”]. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Assembly of First Nations, “AFN National Chief Bellegarde welcomes Canada’s 
consent to certification of national class action involving First Nations child and family 
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than the human rights complaint, with the potential to compensate First Nations 
children affected from 1991 onwards (compared to the Tribunal’s compensation 
order, from 2006 onwards).118 The Government of Canada emphasized that the 
CHRT compensation order “does not properly address all issues around 
appropriate compensation”119 and the $40,000 block compensation regardless of 
the recipient’s circumstances could result in unfairness.120 Canon’s framework 
provides two possible explanations for why institutional behaviour change has 
occurred faster in the class actions: (1) political factors; and (2) community 
pressure.121 Underfunding on-reserve child welfare became a 2019 federal 
election issue, and the Liberal government faced extensive criticism for its failure 
to comply with the CHRT’s order.122 The Liberal government also received 
significant criticism from various Indigenous stakeholders about its failure to 
comply with the CHRT’s order.123 It is possible that community pressure reached 
a “tipping point” and the Minister of Justice preferred a politically opportune 
private settlement process over public litigation. 
Systemic Change 
In its 2019 decision, the Tribunal emphasized that the evidence supported 
individual remedies (compensation for children and their families) and systemic 
remedies (policy and funding formula changes), both of which fall within the 
Tribunal’s remedial jurisdiction under the CHRA.124 On the underlying remedial 
objective, the Tribunal noted that this case was about “justice” and “real and 
measurable change.”125 
Real and measurable change can only be achieved if the CHRT can 
successfully “grant remedial orders that can be an effective counter to the full 
 
118 Ibid. 
119 Indigenous Services Canada, supra note 114. 
120 Barrera, “Ottawa in talks”, supra note 115. 
121 Canon, supra note 55 at 95-96. 
122 Teresa Wright, “Trudeau government appeals ruling on compensation to First 
Nations children” Global News (4 October 2019), online: 
<globalnews.ca/news/5991248/appeal-indigenous-children-welfare>. 
123 Ibid. 
124 FNCFCS 2019 Decision, supra note 4 at para 13. 
125 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 at para 451 [emphasis original].  
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extent of the proven discrimination, and penetrate known institutional barriers to 
change.”126 While the Attorney General has signalled the desire to implement the 
systemic orders and change Canada’s child welfare funding formulas,127 the act of 
filing for judicial review over the issue of monetary compensation—after almost 
a decade of protracted litigation—appears hypocritical and contrary to the 
Government of Canada’s commitment to reconciliation.128 
In the 2016 FNCFCS decision, the Tribunal ordered AANDC to reform the 
First Nations Child & Family Services Program and 1965 Agreement (a cost-
sharing agreement between the Government of Ontario and Government of 
Canada), cease applying discriminatory funding formulas for First Nations child 
welfare, and apply the full meaning and scope of Jordan’s Principle.129 Indigenous 
Services Canada cited several key policy developments as evidence of systemic 
changes that complied with the CHRT decisions: reforms to on-reserve child 
welfare funding principles, the introduction of Bill C-92 to reform the 
administration of First Nations child welfare, and a more liberal interpretation of 
Jordan’s Principle (resulting in the fulfillment of 478,000 requests for funding for 
products, services, and supports).130 Indigenous Services Canada has also changed 
the funding formula, allowing First Nations child and family service agencies to 
bill Indigenous Services Canada at actual cost, both for future service delivery and 
retroactively back to January 26, 2016.131 Modernizing the 1965 Agreement has 
 
126 Brodsky, Day & Kelly, supra note 8 at 4. 
127 2018 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 1 at para 449.  
128 Olivia Stefanovich, “Trudeau government seeks judicial review of tribunal decision 
to compensate First Nations kids”, CBC News (2019), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news/politics/human-rights-tribunal-liberal-child-welfare-appeal-
1.5308897>. 
129 2016 FNCFCS Decision, supra note 14 at para 481. 
130 Indigenous Services Canada, supra note 114; Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada, “Contributions to provide women, children and families with protection and 
prevention services” (1 April 2019), online: <www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1386520802043/1386520921574>. 
131 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, “First Nations Child and Family 
Service Agency Funding Changes per the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal” (2 January 
2019), online: 
<fncaringsociety.com/sites/default/files/fncfsa_funding_changes_0.pdf>. 
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required extensive federal-provincial negotiations, and appears to remain an 
ongoing initiative for Indigenous Services Canada.132 
V. DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
These case studies provide three key observations about how Crown 
executive actors respond to tribunal or court-ordered remedies: (1) they are 
largely distrusting of remedies ordered by administrative tribunals; (2) they are 
often motivated by political opportunism; and (3) they often opt to introduce 
systemic changes through soft law rather than legally binding measures. These 
observations are not intended to reflect universal truths in public law litigation; 
undoubtedly, there are numerous examples of court-ordered remedies achieving 
meaningful change for Crown executive actors and other affected parties. Instead, 
these observations about two specific case studies provide a starting point to 
explore the issue of remedies in public law litigation further.   
While the Kanthasamy decision was not heard before an administrative 
tribunal prior to its judicial review application, the Attorney General’s conduct 
throughout the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society proceedings has 
demonstrated significant distrust. In the Federal Court hearing to stay the 
CHRT’s compensation ruling, Department of Justice lawyer Robert Frater argued 
that the CHRT compensation ruling was an “unnecessarily invasive piece of 
surgery by the wrong doctors.”133 In the CHRT compensation hearing, the 
Attorney General vigorously argued that individual compensation orders were 
out of the scope of the CHRT’s remedial jurisdiction for an issue of systemic 
discrimination.134 The CHRT found the Attorney General’s consistent failure to 
comply with the Tribunal’s previous orders to be wilful and reckless, as public 
 
132 Jorge Barrera, “50-year-old Ontario First Nation child welfare agreement blamed for 
Sixties Scoop under review” CBC News (1 February 2018), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/child-welfare-agreement-ontario-first-nations-under-
review-1.4515321>. 
133 The Canadian Press, “First Nations child welfare advocate accuses feds of ‘shopping 
around’ courts” CTV News (26 November 2019), online: 
<www.ctvnews.ca/politics/first-nations-child-welfare-advocate-accuses-feds-of-
shopping-around-courts-1.4703078>. 
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officials continued to act with full awareness of the adverse consequences for 
First Nations children and their families.135 The Attorney General’s relentless 
non-compliance with the CHRT’s previous enforcement orders reflects a culture 
of distrust and a reluctance to defer to the Tribunal’s authority.   
In these cases, political opportunism also has a significant influence on how 
executive actors responded to court and tribunal-ordered remedies. The 
Kanthasamy decision was issued shortly after the Liberal majority government took 
office in 2015. At the time, the government’s stance on immigration signalled a 
significant shift in Canada’s immigration policy by committing to accept 25,000 
Syrian refugees.136 The photograph of the deceased 3-year-old Turkish refugee 
child Alan Kurdi also had a significant galvanizing effect on Canadian officials to 
respond to the worldwide refugee crisis, with a particular emphasis on expediting 
files for child asylum seekers.137 While Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s soft 
law changes were not directly attributed to this policy announcement, it may have 
been politically convenient for Citizenship and Immigration Canada to apply a 
more “compassionate” interpretation of H&C factors in their review of asylum 
applications at this time. Similarly, in First Nations Child and Family Caring Society 
the Government of Canada opted to issue a public statement about compensating 
First Nations children affected by on-reserve child welfare after the issue became 
highly politicized in the 2019 federal election.  
The executive actors in these cases also favoured soft law as a remedial 
measure, potentially due to its lack of legally binding authority. In Kanthasamy, the 
soft law policy changes introduced by Citizenship and Immigration Canada did 
not impose any new legal requirements on immigration officers under the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act or Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 
(e.g., codifying the best interests of the child principle in statute). Since 
 
135 Ibid at paras 234-35. 
136 CBC News, “Justin Trudeau’s promise to take 25,000 Syrian refugees this year 
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<www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-syria-refugees-settlement-groups-1.3291959>. 
137 Ian Austen, “Aylan Kurdi’s Death Resonates in Canadian Election Campaign” New 
York Times (3 September 2015), online: 
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Citizenship and Immigration Canada kept the best interests of the child principle 
wholly discretionary for immigration officers, the principle is repeatedly re-
litigated in the Federal Court. In First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, the 
only legally binding remedial measure was the introduction of Bill C-92. However, 
Bill C-92 does not contain any legally binding commitments and “provides little 
protection for the hard-won gains at the CHRT nor does it include Jordan’s 
Principle.”138 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Former Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin once observed that “a right, no 
matter how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for 
its breach.”139 The case studies of Kanthasamy and First Nations Child and Family 
Caring Society provide two examples of underwhelming outcomes in public law 
litigation for executive action where the remedies were unenforceable or offered 
limited recourse. By quashing the immigration officer’s decision and providing 
guidance for the interpretation and application of ministerial guidelines in 
Kanthasamy, the Supreme Court of Canada created significant, substantial policy 
changes in immigration law. However, there appear to be ongoing challenges with 
individual behaviour change to ensure that immigration officers comply with the 
best interests of the child principle. In First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, 
the CHRT faced significant challenges enforcing individual and systemic orders 
against Indigenous Services Canada. The litigation at the CHRT and Federal 
Court has spanned nearly a decade, and the CHRT continues to oversee the two 
billion dollar compensation order for 54,000 First Nations children affected by 
the decision. In contrast, the six billion dollar class action lawsuit launched by 
Meawasige and Moushoom in 2019 has already secured a public commitment 
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from the Government of Canada to participate in settlement proceedings to 
compensate a larger class of First Nations children.140  
These observations underscore the importance of strategic litigation when 
parties sue the Crown for executive action, recognizing that the remedial 
outcomes can be incremental at best. The litigants’ choice of decision-making 
body, plaintiff, procedure, and legal issue can significantly impact the scope of 
available remedies and the timeliness of the relief. While administrative tribunals 
typically have a broader scope of systemic remedies available to them, the First 
Nations Child and Family Caring Society litigation has demonstrated that the 
enforcement of those remedies—particularly if they are politically contested—
can be a challenging time and resource-intensive process. This paper has provided 
a preliminary framework to evaluate remedies against the Crown for executive 
action, but in the absence of further empirical research it is difficult to make more 
substantive claims about the most effective strategies for Canadian public law 
litigation. It would be beneficial for future research to trace the implementation 
and enforcement of tribunal and court-ordered remedies over a longer period of 
time and identify additional variables that influence whether meaningful social 
change is achieved. 
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